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Recent Cases
COMMERCIAL PAPER - HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE -
GOOD FAITH AND NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
General Investment Corp. v. Angelini,
58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971).
The law of negotiable instruments is at odds with consumer pro-
tection where the sale of a note to a third party prevents the con-
sumer from raising common defenses. As in the present case of
General Investment Corp. v. Angelini,1 a homeowner often contracts
for home improvements, agrees to finance the work by signing a
note, and thereafter the home improvement contractor sells the note
for value to a finance company as a negotiable instrument. If the
contractor defaults on the contract, the court must decide whom to
protect against the contractor's default - the homeowner who con-
tracted for the goods and services not delivered, or the finance com-
pany who paid value for a negotiable note on which the homeowner
refuses to pay.2 In Angelini, the New Jersey Supreme Court went
to some length to protect the homeowner and to achieve what it
considered to be a socially desirable result. To circumvent the tra-
ditional application of article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) and subject the defendant-finance company to the defense
of failure of consideration, the court relied heavily on public policy
considerations, related state statutes and pre-UCC precedent.
Anthony and Dolores Angelini contracted with Lustro Aluminum
Products, Inc. to have aluminum siding, storm doors and windows
installed on their house.3  At Lustro's insistence, the Angelinis
signed a contract and a note, both of which were executed on De-
cember 10, 1966. At that point the contract and the note were un-
1 58 N.J. 396,278 A.2d 193 (1971).
2 Typically, the installment payment note is made at the highest permitted interest
rate and finance charges. Most likely unknown to the consumer, the retailer thereafter
sells the note at a discount to a financial institution before performing the contract or
delivering the goods. After the retailer's default, the consumer is left with an inde-
pendent obligation to pay off the note he signed. The note is subject to the separate
body of negotiable instruments law (article 3, Commercial Paper, of the Uniform Corn-
mercial Code (UCC)), while the consumer is left with an action on the contract (article
2, Sales, of the UCC), against a retailer who has defaulted because of dishonesty or bank-
ruptcy, or has left town. The individual consumer is severely limited financially, but is
faced with a burdensome action against the financial institution and a virtually worth-
less action against the retailer.
3 See note 24 infra.
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dated.4  The note itself did not provide when payments were to be-
gin, although the contract specified that payments were not to com-
mence until 60 days after Lustro had completed the work.5 The note
originally made in favor of Lustro was sold on December 19 to
General Investment Corp., which regularly dealt with and was famil-
iar with the operations of Lustro.8 At that point, the note provided
that payments would begin on February 19, 1967. As part of the
transaction, Lustro falsely warranted to General Investment that the
work on the Angelini house had been completed. 7  In fact, Lustro
had failed to install the home improvements, subsequently became
insolvent, and defaulted on their contract.
About December 24, 1966, the Angelinis received a payment
coupon book for the note from General Investment. The first
monthly payment was due on February 19, 1967 - exactly 62 days
after the note had been discounted. The Angelinis returned the
coupon book, calling to General Investment's attention the fact that
the work had not been completed and that the contract required no
payments until 60 days after completion. The matter remained dor-
mant for several months, and then General Investment sued the
Angelinis on the unpaid note.8 General Investment prevailed at the
4 The trial court settled this issue of fact. It found that the note, when executed by
the Angelinis, bore no dates. 58 N.J. at 400, 278 A.2d at 195. See UCC § 3-114()
which provides that the "negotiability of an instrument is not affected by the fact that
it is undated, antedated or postdated."
5 The cash price for the work was $3600. Interest at the highest rate and finance
charges brought the principal sum to $5363A0, payable in 84 monthly installments of
$63.85. 58 N.J. at 399, 278 A.2d at 194.
6 General Investment handles approximately 1800 home improvement loans annually
from 300 contractors; 10 percent of this volume came from Lustro. When General
Investment purchases a note it reads and keeps a copy of the work contract as part of its
records. The Angelini court treated the contract and note as interrelated parts of a single
transaction. 58 N.J. at 400,278 A.2d at 195.
Lustro endorsed the Angelini note to General Investment "without recourse." Id.
Endorsing without recourse was an attempt by Lustro to cut off any liability for the
Angelinis' non-payment to General Investment or any subsequent holder of the note.
In spite of this provision, General Investment later sought "adjustment" from Lustro
when the Angelinis refused payment of the note because the work had not been com-
pleted. Id. at 402, 278 A.2d at 196.
7 Lustro warranted that it had "furnished and installed all articles and materials
and ... fully completed all work which constitutes the consideration for which this note
was executed and delivered by the maker." Id. at 400, 278 A.2d at 195.
The court noted that, although General Investment could have required a certificate
of completion from Lustro signed by the Angelinis or inquired of the homeowner
whether the work was in fact completed, it did neither. By statute the request for or
acceptance of such certificate by Lustro from the Angelinis would have been unlawful
since the work had not yet been completed. See Home Repair Financing Act of 1960,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-66 (1960).
8 The insolvent contractor, although a defendant below, was not an appellant before
the, supreme court for reasons not made explicit in the supreme court opinion.
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trial and appellate levels,9 both lower courts ruling that the plaintiff
was a holder in due course, thus precluding the Angelinis' claim of
failure of consideration as a defense.' 0 After granting the Angelinis'
petition for certification, 1 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
General Investment took the note subject to the defense of failure
of consideration. Since Lustro's default on the contract was undis-
puted, the Angelinis prevailed.
Angelini adopted two independent rationales to justify its con-
clusion. First, the court denied holder in due course status to Gen-
eral Investment on the basis of UCC section 3-302.12 And second,
using section 3-119, it subjected the defendant to the conditional pay-
ment limitation in the accompanying contract, and thus to the de-
fense of failure of consideration.
The UCC definitional requirements of holders in due course un-
der section 3-302 provide that:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instru-
ment
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice ... of any defense against or claim to it
on the part of any person.
If General Investment lacked any of the above requirements, UCC
section 3-306(c) would subject them to the defense of Lustro's fail-
ure of consideration.'" The court limited its consideration of sec-
9 The trial court and appellate court opinions are unreported.
10 The defenses that are cut off against a holder in due course are often called per-
sonal defenses and include such common defenses as failure of consideration, breach of
warranty in the sale of goods, fraud in the inducement, and most cases of illegality.
These defenses are derived from UCC § 3-306. See H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT
255-56 (1970).
A holder in due course is still subject to what are known as real defenses, such as
the less common defenses of infancy and other incapacities, forgery, and some instances
of duress and illegality. See UCC § 3-305.
1157 N.J. 238, 271 A.2d 429 (1970).
12 For long a citadel in the law of negotiable instruments, holder in due course status
has become vulnerable to limiting statutes and court decisions where it may affect the
consumer. Recognizing the social evils that may flow from negotiability, some legisla-
tures have forbidden negotiable instruments in consumer installment transactions and
courts have stretched facts to deny finance companies holder in due course status. See
Rosenthal, Negotiability - Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 379-80 (1971).
The Angelini court followed this anti-negotiability trend in denying holder in due
course status to a finance company that had purchased a consumer-made note. Angelini
is remarkable for the lengths to which the court went in interpreting the UCC to protect
the consumer and for its heavy reliance on public policy considerations.
13 Moreover, once the Angelinis established the defense of failure of consideration,
the finance company had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
they were a holder in due course in all respects. UCC § 3-307(3).
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ion 3-302 to the good faith requirement. Historically, the test for
this requirement has vacillated between two standards - one sub-
jective, the other objective. The subjective standard looks to the
mind of the particular holder to ensure there was no dishonest mo-
tive or knowledge of a defense or defect at the time of the taking of
the instrument. The objective standard places on the taker the duty
of a reasonable and prudent inquiry into the circumstances at the
taking to discover any defect or defense. Reasonableness is deter-
mined by the generally accepted commercial standards of the partic-
ular business. The UCC has basically adopted the subjective stan-
dard for determining good faith, which traditionally has been
preferred by the courts. 14
Although Angelini indicated that good faith would be deter-
mined using the subjective standard,'" the court relied on the author-
ity of Unico v. Owen'6 - a case actually using the objective standard.
On the basis of Unico, the court found General Investment not to
have taken in good faith because of their closeness to the transac-
tion. Unico reasoned that the closer the holder stands to the under-
lying transaction, the more he controls, participates and becomes in-
volved in it, and the less he needs the protection afforded a holder
in due course.' But in Unico the finance company was completely
dependent upon the retailer for its business and, on the facts, stood
far closer to the seller of the note than General Investment did to
Lustro.'8 Although Unico can be distinguished from the instant
case on these grounds, the court relied on it to show the interrelation
of the work contract and the note, which together were taken to es-
tablish General Investment's closeness and lack of good faith.
The court further examined the existence of good faith under
14 The UCC definitionally adopts the subjective standard as set out in section 1-201
(19). The subjective test of "honesty in fact" is the basic standard throughout article 3
of the UCC. There are few exceptions employing the objective standard in article 3.
The New Jersey Study Comments criticized the UCC for continuing the "bad law" of the
objective standard rather than making the subjective standard applicable throughout.
See New Jersey Study Comment 1B to UCC § 3-302. (New Jersey has adopted, as law,
a unique set of Study Comments as well as the official Comments to the UCC.) UCC §
3-302 (1) (b) does not specify that anything broader than the subjective standard should
be used to determine good faith in holders in due course.
15 58 N.J. at 403, 278 A.2d at 196. The court stated that good faith is to be deter-
mined by "looking to the mind of the particular holder" and cited UCC § 1-201(19),
which defines good faith as "honesty in fact."
1 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
'1 Id. at 109-10,232 A.2d at 410.
18 Unico was a partnership formed expressly for the purpose of financing its parent's
operations. General Investment is an independent corporation, with only 10 percent of
its volume originating with Lustro.
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the standard enunciated in Joseph v. Lesnevich.'9 Lesnevich held
that circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the note that raised
questions as to whether the promise to pay was conditional were of
probative value in deciding the question of good faith.20 The An-
gelini opinion acknowledged the traditional rule that a holder is un-
der no duty to investigate possible defenses where a note is negoti-
able and regular on its face. But the court held that unique policy
considerations in consumer home repair transactions require close
scrutiny for the existence of good faith.2' Under this approach -
which goes well beyond Lesnevich - a lack of good faith can be
established in such transactions if the holder's failure to inquire
arose from a desire to avoid an investigation he believed would dis-
close a defense arising from the transaction. 2
Thus, on the issue of defeating good faith, the court in reality
applied an objective standard. While declaring it would look to the
mind of the particular holder, the favored subjective standard, the
court employed, and even exceeded, 23 the limits of the objective -
inquiry into surrounding circumstances - standard. The court's in-
quiry into these objective, surrounding circumstances yielded the fol-
lowing. General Investment required the work contract be sub-
mitted when it discounted the note, and therefore it knew the An-
gelinis' liability to commence payment was dependent upon com-
pletion of the work in a good and workmanlike manner. The court
further commented that, in spite of the substantial nature of the
work required on the house,2 4 General Investment accepted Lustro's
false representation that the work had been completed in nine days.
Although General Investment could have requested that Lustro ob-
19 56 N.J. Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1959).
20Id. at 348, 153 A.2d at 354.
21 58 N.J. at 403, 278 A.2d at 197.
22Id., citing Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 N.J. Super. 340, 349, 153 A.2d 349, 354
(App. Div. 1959).
2 3 The court exceeded the objective standard in that it apparently would have de-
manded General Investment to thoroughly investigate the time required for full per-
formance of the substantial home improvements specified under Lustro's work contract.
Furthermore, Angelini indicates that a finance company must have personal knowledge
of the fact of completion of such work. See notes 24-27 infra & accompanying text.
2 4 The work contract provided that Lustro would:
Supply & Install Gold Bond Plasticrylic Avocado Siding with Grey Sills &
Trim. Apply Heavy Quilted Breather Foil on all wall areas around complete
house. Corner posts to be green, all mullions to be fabricated in grey alumi-
num. Supply & install 2 anodized storm doors (Rear & Side Entrances). All
overhangs & trim to be covered with special Marine Paint in grey color (as
close as possible to Oxford grey trim).
This will include cleaning up the job. 58 N.J. at 399, 278 A.2d at 197.
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tain a certificate of completion 5 from Angelini at the discounting
event, it neither demanded such a certificate nor personally inquired
of the homeowner as to completion. The Angelini court inferred
from these facts that the company failed to seek actual knowledge
because it feared that inquiry would disclose the defense of failure
of consideration. According to the court, this failure to inquire
evidenced an "intentional closing of the eyes and mind to any de-
fects in or defenses to the transaction." '  Thus, not only did An-
gelini fail to apply the narrower subjective standard it purported to
apply, it even gave an unusually broad interpretation to the objec-
tive standard in the name of consumer-homeowner protection. The
facts in Unico are easily distinguishable, and the theory of Lesne-
vich had to be expanded to encompass Angelini and allow a broad
inquiry into the contract performance, as well as the circumstances
surrounding the sale of the noteY
The UCC subsection 3-302(1) (c) requirement that a taking be
without notice of any defense or claim to the instrument was ig-
nored in the Angelini opinion. Apparently because the court con-
cluded that good faith was lacking in the transaction, it felt there
was no reason to proceed further with section 3-302. But Angelini's
sole dependence upon the good faith requirement is questionable.
As the court's discussion of good faith shows, the critical issue was
whether General Investment had notice of the defense of failure of
consideration at the time of the taking. The court's entire reason
for finding a lack of good faith was General Investment's knowl-
edge of the payment condition of the work contract and the circum-
stances surrounding the negotiation. But this is more precisely the
issue of notice of a defense than the lack of good faith and conse-
quently should have been approached under subsection 3-302(1) (c).
Subsection 3-304(4) (b), which explains the elements of notice to a
purchaser, specifies that mere notice of a separate executory work
contract alone does not prevent a party from taking in due course.28
In that provision, notice to a purchaser is limited by the following:
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give
the purchaser notice of a defense or claim
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory
25 See a discussion of the certificate of completion in note 7 supra.
26 58 N.J. at 405,278 A.2d at 197.
2 7 The court justified its expansion of the language of Lesnevich simply on the
grounds of unique policy considerations. Id.
28 See UCC § 3-304, Comment 9.
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promise or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the
purchaser has notice that a defense or claim has arisen from
the terms thereof . . . . (emphasis added)
Notice to General Investment would have turned on whether it
knew at the discounting event that the defense of failure of consid-
eration had arisen from the terms of the contract. Thus, the mere
fact that the note was taken on an executory contract cannot of it-
self have given rise to notice of a defense. A fortiori, where Gen-
eral Investment received a warranty of completion, they cannot be
held to have taken with notice of a defense. To hold otherwise
would unjustifiably penalize the finance company for accepting what
appeared to be a protection to all parties, including the consumer-
homeowner. General Investment had no duty to investigate or any
reason to question Lustro's warranty since nine days were more than
sufficient to complete such home improvements.
Moreover, had General Investment checked with the Angelinis
on December 19 to see if the work had been completed, the fact
that it had not been completed on that date would have been incon-
clusive since Lustro had two days to finish the work. The first pay-
ment was due on February 19, and 60 days prior to that was Decem-
ber 21. Thus, on December 19 the defense of failure of
consideration could not yet have arisen, since UCC subsection 3-
304(4) (b) requires that the purchaser have notice that a defense
has already arisen at the time of the taking.
The Angelini court also concluded that UCC section 3-119 pro-
vided an independent basis for denying holder in due course status
to General Investment. That section provides:
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any
transferee the terms of an instrument may be modified or affected by
any other written agreement executed as part of the same transac-
tion, except that a holder in due course is not affected by any limi-
tation of his rights arising out of the separate written agreement if
he had no notice of the limitation when he took the instrument.
Since the New Jersey courts had not yet interpreted section 3-119
and no pertinent cases from any other jurisdiction were brought
forward, the court merely commented that their pre-UCC "case law
[was] generally in line with" the rule that section lays down.29
In interpreting section 3-119, the court relied primarily upon
General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Moon Carrier Corp.Y In Moon,
decided 28 years prior to the present case, the notes which had been
29 New Jersey Study Comment to UCC § 3-119.
ao 129 N.J.L. 431, 29 A.2d 843 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
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purchased by General Contract, a finance company, explicitly limited
the liability of the maker on the basis of a specific accompanying
agreement. Citing Moon, the Angelini court said:
The Court of Errors and Appeals denied recovery saying that where
a note refers to or is accompanied by a collateral contemporaneous
agreement which limits the scope of liability on the note, or if the
purchaser of the note has actual knowledge of such an agreement
even if it neither accompanies the note, nor is referred to therein,
he takes it subject to the terms of the agreement.3 1
Applying such a broad holding to interpret the language of sec-
tion 3-119 is at least questionable. The Comments to section 3-119
indicate that it deals with terms of payment. In Moon, the notes
were accompanied by such a limitation on the terms of payment. In
the present case, however, the issue was not a term of payment,
such as an acceleration of payment clause or the like, but a condi-
tion of payment expressed in the work contract.
The problem with the Angelini court's interpretation of section
3-119 is obvious: if notice of a contract is to be considered a limita-
tion making payment of the note conditional on performance of that
contract, then the note is no longer a negotiable instrument. UCC
subsections 3-104(1) (b)-(c) provide that a negotiable instrument
must contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain at a
definite time or on demand. If a note is conditional upon eventual
completion of the work 60 days in advance of payment, then it does
not meet the requirements. This result cannot be the intent of the
statute because section 3-119 speaks in terms of an instrument, mean-
ing a negotiable instrument. 2
The conclusion that Angelini misinterpreted section 3-119 is fur-
ther supported by subsection (2) of that section, which provides that
a separate agreement does not affect the negotiability of an instru-
ment. Official UCC Comment 5 to that section states that negotiabil-
ity is always determined by what appears on the face of the instru-
ment alone.
Moreover, UCC subsection 3-105(1) (c) specifically says that a
promise to pay is not made conditional by the fact that the note
states that it (the note) arises out of a separate agreement. This sub-
section was intended to reject earlier cases which had held - as did
Angelini - that "a reference to a separate agreement [meant] that
3158 N.J. at 406, 278 A.2d at 198 (Emphasis added).
32 See UCC § 3-102(1) (e).
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payment of the instrument must be limited in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, and hence was conditioned by it. ' 33
Finally, as previously mentioned, subsection 3-304(4) (b), which
is to be read together with sections 3-105 and 3-119,34 appears to con-
clude that the mere knowledge of the conditions of a separate con-
tract (whether executory or not) tendered with a negotiable note
does not amount to notice of a defense having arisen therein. If
attaching the contract to the note renders the note nonnegotiable, as
Angelini implies, then subsection 3-304(4) (b) will never operate
because notice is only at issue once you have a negotiable instrument.
It is, of course, fundamental that one does not interpret part of a
statute so as to render another part of it permanently inoperative.
This is not to say that the purchaser of a note accompanied by a
contract takes subject to none of the terms of the contract. If the
contract changes the time of payment or date of payment and the
purchaser takes with notice of these limitations, the contract would
control. However, the official Comments indicate that section 3-119
was intended to cover all such matters. In deciding that section
3-119 could be used to make the note subject to the conditions of the
contract, the Angelini court apparently did not realize that the ef-
fect of their reasoning would be to generally defeat the negotiability
of notes accompanied by contracts.
The court achieved its desired result of granting relief to a par-
ticular consumer note-maker caught in the grip of commercial paper,
and of giving effect to the policy of removing home repair notes
from the working of negotiable instruments law. UCC sections
3-119 and 3-302(1) (b) were chosen as the vehicles for a strongly,
and perhaps correctly, desired public policy. But in the process, sec-
tion 3-119 suffered, as did article 3 generally. All note-takers hav-
ing any knowledge of a retail contract will no longer be taking ne-
gotiable instruments if the present interpretation of section 3-119 is
applied elsewhere. Possibly recognizing this problem, the court shut
the door tightly on the present holding, limiting it to the immediate
facts.35
The overriding public policy considerations were clearly set out
in the opinion, and their power in determining the result was ac-
knowledged. The court found and filled a need for less stringent
33 UCC § 3-105, Comment 3.
34 UCC § 3-304(4)(b) is to be read together with §§ 3-105 and 3-119 as to when
a promise is unconditional and as to other writings affecting the instrument. See
UCC § 3-304, Comment 9.
35 58 N.J. at 409, 278 A.2d at 200.
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rules to deal with commercial paper arising in consumer goods trans-
actions3 6 The New Jersey Home Repair Financing Act of 1960 and
its 1969 supplement37 were used as "aids" to the court in interpret-
ing section 3-119. The 1969 law, the court noted, made home repair
notes subject to the terms and conditions of the work contract and
no longer treated them as negotiable instruments under article 3 of
the UCC. These statutes were intended to protect the homeowner
from being victimized by the oppressive and unconscionable tactics
of irresponsible and untrustworthy contractors0 8 The strong purpose
of this policy argument was held to impose upon the court an obli-
gation to liberally construe the UCC, and section 3-119 in particular,
in favor of the homeowner note-maker.3 9
In a very real sense, the Angelini court transferred the risk of loss
brought on by a defaulting third party from the note-maker to the
note-holder. This changes the concept of caveat emptor. The
traditional victim, the buyer of goods and services, is protected in
favor of a new victim, the buyer of commercial paper who must now
be careful from whom he purchases. The broad judicial intention
in cases such as the present one is evident in the following excerpt
from a case decided 18 years before Angelini, where the closeness of
the finance company to an installment sales transaction was the ba-
sis for denying holder in due course status and subjecting the note
to the defense of failure of consideration:
It may be that our holding here will require some changes in
36 Id. at 407, 278 A.2d at 199. The court cited UCC § 9-206, Comment 2, in sup-
port of its policy argument denying such rights and protections to the finance company
in the present case. But article 9, Secured Transactions, etc., which is inapplicable to
this case neither adopts nor rejects the judicial doctrine that a bolder may have been too
close to the underlying transaction to be granted holder in due course immunity.
37The 1969 supplement to the Home Repair Financing Act of 1960 reads in per-
tinent part:
No home repair contract shall require or entail the execution of any note
unless such note shall have printed the words "Consumer Note" in 10-point
bold type or larger on the face thereof. Such a note with the words "Consumer
Note" printed thereon shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the home
repair contract and shall not be a negotiable instrument within the meaning of
chapter 3 (Commercial Paper) of the Uniform Commercial Code. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:16C-64.2 (1969).
3858 N.J. at 407, 278 A.2d at 199. The strong language the court used to character-
ize home repair contractors resembles the wording and intent of UCC § 2-302, which
deals with unconscionability.
The court also cited Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), a landmark decision in unconscionable installment sales contracts.
3958 N.J. at 409, 278 A.2d at 199. The 1969 supplement to the Home Repair Fi-
nancing Act of 1960 was not enacted in time to govern this case. Nevertheless, the
court arrived at the same result as that new law dictates by applying the policy of that
act retroactively. See note 37 supra for the pertinent text of the 1969 law.
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business methods and will impose a greater burden on finance com-
panies. We think the buyer - Mr. & Mrs. General Public -
should have some protection somewhere along the line. We believe
the finance company is better able -to bear the risk of the dealer's
insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position to protect his
interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.40
Historically, it was believed that protecting the good faith pur-
chaser helped the unfettered flow of commerce. The doctrines of
negotiable instruments law assumed that the good faith holder took
free of all personal defenses. Business development would presum-
ably be facilitated by the free circulation of credit and money fos-
tered by these policies.4t But in recent years courts and legislatures
have yielded to a rising awareness of the social and economic dis-
utility of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions. 42
Still, a condemnation of the effects of negotiability on the con-
sumer is perhaps unwarranted. The consumer who has signed a
negotiable note is effectively in the same position as a cash pur-
chaser who has paid in full. The obligation to pay and the payment
in full have both been completed.4  The limited remedies avail-
able against a retailer who subsequently defaults are the same in
both situations. Furthermore, where negotiability has been removed
by statute, it has been suggested that the businessman and consumer
alike suffer economic ill-effects.44  Nevertheless, judicial fact-
stretching to deny finance companies holder in due course status is
4 0 Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953), cited in Unico
v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,232 A.2d 405 (1967).
41 It can be argued that small merchants and minority businessmen struggling to gain
a foothold would still benefit from the free negotiability doctrines. However, stronger
considerations of consumer protection, it is also argued, should outweigh this. See
H. KMiPKE, supra note 10, at 260-61.
42 Negotiability has been criticized for its severe and unfair impact upon the poorest
members of the community, particularly in reference to the law governing consumer
installment purchases. Revision of the law in this sphere of consumer activity, it has
been suggested, will help alleviate more general social ills. See REP., NAT'iL AV.
COMM. ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Kerner Commission) 274-77 (N.Y. Times ed., 1968).
43 An alternative contrivance is for the buyer to make an independent loan and then
pay for the purchase of goods or services in cash. The obligation to pay is then theo-
retically independent of the transaction and thus immune to any defense in that transac-
tion. In this context, a straight cash purchaser is similarly at the sole mercy of the re-
tailer with whom he has dealt. The same theory can be reversed in application to a
home repair contractor. If the contractor borrows independently on his accounts receiv-
able to finance work proposed under an executory contract - rather than selling a re-
lated note, as in Angelini - the risk falls on him and not the homeowner.
44 A recent study of the Connecticut Home Solicitation Sales Act of 1967, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-134 - 42-143 (Supp. 1968), suggests that where negotiability
protections were cut off by statute in the home improvement business, available credit
was significantly reduced, dealers lost some business and the consumer ultimately faced
higher costs. See Note, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE
increasingly being coupled with the legislative remedy of statutes
forbidding the use of negotiable instruments in consumer install-
ment transactions.4 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Angelini, however, failed to
limit itself to judicial fact-stretching. The direct statutory remedy
of the 1969 supplement to the New Jersey Home Repair Financing
Act of 1960 was not yet available to the court, so it chose to give
the UCC a skewed interpretation in the guise of consumer protec-
tion. While the UCC does establish different rules for commercial
and non-commercial situations, these distinctions should not be
forged through judicial gloss. The harm done article 3 by Angelini
may upset legitimate commercial needs if the instant case is given
future authority beyond its limited holding. Perhaps the valuable
applications of negotiability rules are limited to the purely commer-
cial sphere. But the removal of these rules from the domain of con-
sumer transactions seems best left to the legislature, and not to judi-
dal interpretations of article 3 of the UCC.46
4 5 See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. c. 255, § 12 F, as added by Acts 1970, c. 457; N.Y. PEES. PROP. LAw § 403(3),
(6), as amended by L. 1970, c. 299; UNIFOEM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.403-A04;
Rosenthal supra note 12. See also the proposed regulation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, which if adopted would make the use of a promissory note to cut off a buyer's
defenses a deceptive trade practice. 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (Jan. 1971).
4 6 In Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 401-02, the author concluded that:
Negotiability has been an extremely valuable concept, which has kept open
channels of commerce and permitted transactions to take place with a minimum
of inquiry and investigation. It is not suggested here that where negotiability
serves such purposes it should be curtailed. The eternal ingenuity of the legal
profession, however, has been such that devices and techniques designed for
one purpose are often employed for another, and significantly different, pur-
pose.... IThere is no reason why we cannot pick and choose, retaining ne-
gotiability where it serves worthy ends and eliminating it where it produces
harmful or aimless results.
Thus, article 3 of the UCC should be retained in purely commercial transactions, while
the legislatures can immunize the consumer to the inequities in the law of negotiability.
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